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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress and Finding
that Law Enforcement's Warrantless Intrusion into Mr. Foote's Apartment was
Justified
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Foote analyzed law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into

his apartment on or about February 13, 2012, under the applicable Idaho case law and explained
how law enforcement's entry and subsequent search was unlawful. Mr. Foote further explained
how the district court's reliance on Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012) and State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804 (2009) was misplaced. In response the State apparently concedes that the district
court's reliance upon Bishop was in error as it offers no argument at all to justify the district
court's holding in that regard. Instead the State argues the welfare check upon Mr. Foote is
analogous to the investigation of whether a juvenile intends to shoot up his school in Ryburn.
Brief of Respondent, pp. 7 - 10. Finally, the State asks this Court to uphold the district court's
dismissal of Mr. Foote's motion to suppress by expanding the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement in Idaho even though this argument was not raised by the State in the
proceedings below nor contemplated by the district court. Id. at 10 - 12. The State's arguments
are unpersuasive and should be rejected.
1.

Law enforcement's entry into Mr. Foote's residence was not permitted under the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement because there was no objectively
reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent

In an attempt to justify law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into Mr. Foote's
apartment the State embellishes the factual findings of the district court with the apparent hope
that this case will be similar to the exigency found by in Supreme Court in Ryburn. The State
repeatedly characterizes Mr. Foote as "out of control." Brief of Respondent, pp. 7, 9, & 10 - 11.
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The findings of the district court and the record in this case do not support this characterization.
The district court found law enforcement was responding to a "disturbance" by a tenant
and that the landlord was simply concerned "about something happening to the apartment."
Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 6 - 11. When law enforcement knocked on the
apartment door and asked Mr. Foote to come downstairs, Mr. Foote, who "looked a little
disheveled, was disorientated, and was sweating," "put his hand in his pocket and turned back
into the apartment." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 69, In. 18 - p. 70, In. 4. There is no
evidence that Mr. Foote acted crazed or aggressively towards anyone. There is no evidence
anyone suspected Mr. Foote possessed a firearm or other weapon. There is not even evidence
that the initial disturbance was still ongoing when law enforcement arrived at the residence and
walked up the stairs to Mr. Foote's apartment. He simply answered the door, put his hand in his
pocket, and walked back inside his apartment. Mr. Foote was not out of control. Contrary to the
State's arguments, there are no objective facts supporting imminent violence in this case, and
therefore, Ryburn is inapplicable.
Furthermore, the assertion Mr. Foote needed protection from himself or medical
assistance is undermined by law enforcement's testimony. In order to justify entry into a
residence on this basis law enforcement would have had to possess known facts, together with
reasonable inferences, at the time of entry that they needed to "render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371,
374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009). Dispatch advised law enforcement that a
landlord was concerned about his apartment and the tenant was "yelling about missing some
medication or something like that." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 8, Ins. 11 - 15. Law
enforcement subsequently knocked on Mr. Foote's door and was able to observe him. Officer
2

Adrignola testified that upon seeing Mr. Foote in the doorway Officer Adrignola no longer had a
concern for Mr. Foote's welfare and there was no need to call an ambulance. Motion to Suppress
Transcript, p. 13, Ins. 14 - I 9. There is no evidence of an obvious and ongoing medical
emergency warranting life saving action. Simply put, there is no objective evidence that Mr.
Foote needed protection from imminent injury. As such, the immediate entry into his apartment
cannot be justified under this exception.
2.

Law enforcement should not be permitted to enter a residence without a warrant
simply because a landlord is concerned the property is being damaged

The State asks this Court to expand Idaho law and permit law enforcement to enter a
residence without a warrant if there is an immediate need to protect property. Brief of
Respondent, pp. 10 -12. In furthering this argument the State relies upon People v. Mitchell, 39
N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976) abrogated by Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed. 2d 650 (2006), which is apparently the origin of this expansive
"emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The State's argument should be rejected.
To begin with, there was no immediate need for assistance to protect property here. Upon
arrival law enforcement was merely aware the landlord was concerned for his property at the
time he called dispatch. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the concern or situation
was ongoing. There is no evidence law enforcement heard anything as they walked into and
through the landlord's house or climbed the stairs to Mr. Foote's apartment. There was also no
evidence law enforcement saw any damage to the landlord's property. Any concern that property
was being destroyed, even if it was, or that immediate action was necessary, was dispelled when
the disturbance had apparently ceased.
Accepting momentarily for the sake of argument that Mr. Foote was destroying property,
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there is no evidence he was destroying the landlord's property. Mr. Foote may very well have
been destroying his own personal belongings in:side the apartment. Nevertheless, at the point law
enforcement entered Mr. Foote's apartment there were no specific facts supporting the
proposition that Mr. Foote was destroying anything. There was simply a generalized concern.
Perhaps most troubling about the State's argument is the outcome such a holding would
have on a tenant's privacy rights in Idaho. Under the State's proposed expansion oflaw, anytime
a landlord called dispatch concerned about their rental property, law enforcement would be
permitted to enter the residence without a warrant to assure no property was about to be
damaged. Surely this cannot be the law.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Foote's Opening Brief, this Court should
reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress and grant the motion
thereby vacating his judgment of conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted t h i s ~ day of December, 2013.
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